This section positions Value Management Theory (VMT) relative to established bodies of work in economics and related fields. VMT is designed to be compatible with these theories, while providing a distinct analytical focus: value as an interpreted change of state within a value system, represented through value elements and value flows.
1. Money as a Value Transfer Element
In VMT, money is treated as a universal element for transferring value, whose interpretation is relatively synchronized across many value systems.
Nevertheless, monetary elements remain subject to all VMT properties: their realized value depends on context, interpretation, and subsequent transformation. This explains why identical monetary amounts may be perceived differently by different actors.
2. Consumer Theory: Utility, Preferences, and Characteristics of Goods
2.1. Compatibility with Utility as a Representation of Preferences
Classical microeconomics models choice through preferences and utility. VMT is compatible with this tradition in the sense that:
- criteria G and interpretation rules R may be viewed as a generalized representation of preferences and constraints.
However, VMT adds several structural distinctions:
- explicit separation of sender and receiver interpretations (planned vs realized value) (A4);
- retrospective re-evaluation (Vretro);
- anti-value as an independent category (A5);
- flow-based representability of value dynamics (A3).
2.2. Characteristics of Goods
Lancaster’s approach treats goods as bundles of characteristics. This is conceptually close to VMT’s notion of typed value elements type(E), whose qualitative properties affect how value is interpreted within a system.
The difference is that VMT additionally formalizes:
- asymmetry of planned vs realized value;
- inter-system flows and leakage;
- transformation as a role in the system.
2.3. Revealed Preference Theory as an Empirical Bridge
Revealed preference theory allows reconstruction of preference structure from observed behavior. For VMT, this can serve as a possible bridge for operationalizing G and observable indicators of Vreal under strong latency.
At the same time, VMT is not reducible to revealed preferences, since value remains contextual and multi-layered.
3. General Equilibrium Theory and Prices
Arrow–Debreu theory formalizes the existence of competitive equilibrium given preferences and initial endowments.
VMT is not an equilibrium theory and does not derive market prices. Instead, VMT:
- describes interpreted value and anti-value that may not be expressed in prices;
- is applicable to internal organizational value systems and institutional structures where prices are not sufficient statistics.
Thus, VMT should be treated as an orthogonal (complementary) formalization: value as interpretation within a system, rather than market-clearing via prices.
4. Theory of the Firm, Institutional Economics, and Transaction Costs
The question "why firms exist" (Coase, Williamson) is linked to transaction costs and alternative coordination mechanisms (markets vs hierarchies).
VMT is compatible with this line of thought and refines the descriptive language of coordination costs through:
- anti-value flows (AV);
- flow resistance (Res(F));
- participation conditions of actors;
- the structure of transformation roles.
At the same time, VMT does not replace the theory of the firm: it does not derive optimal firm boundaries, but provides a formal apparatus for describing value/anti-value flows within and between institutional forms.
5. Contract Theory, Incentives, and Information Asymmetry
Contract theory and principal–agent models (Holmström; Hart) formalize settings where observability of actions is limited and incentive imperfections arise.
VMT is conceptually consistent with these theories along two main dimensions:
- Observability/latency (O10) is a structural norm rather than an exception;
- Interpretation asymmetry (A4) provides a general mechanism for divergence between expectations and realization, and can act as a macro-language for describing consequences of incomplete contracts and moral hazard.
At the same time, VMT is not a theory of optimal contracts and does not derive contract forms; it describes value/anti-value dynamics into which contractual mechanisms may be embedded as elements and interpretation rules R.
6. Game Theory and Strategic Interaction
Game theory (von Neumann–Morgenstern) introduces a formalism of strategic interaction and expected utility under uncertainty.
VMT does not compete with game theory: it may use it as an external instrument for modeling actor behavior within a specified value system.
The key difference is that VMT formalizes not strategic choice itself, but the interpretation and dynamics of value/anti-value flows, including retrospective re-evaluation and inter-system leakage.
7. Applied Interpretations
Classical management frameworks and commercial approaches (value chain, value stream, Lean/VSM, DevOps flow metrics, value-based management/EVA) may be interpreted as partial methodological or instrumental layers above VMT, because they:
- use notions of "flow" and "chain",
- but often do not explicitly formalize:
- multiplicity of value systems;
- asymmetry of sender/receiver interpretations;
- role-oriented sustainability;
- absence of a conservation law of value.
8. Philosophical Value Theory
VMT is conceptually compatible with philosophical value theory in its distinctions between instrumental and terminal value, the plurality of value criteria, issues of commensurability and aggregation, and the dependence of value on interpretation and context.
At the same time, VMT does not compete with or replace philosophical value theory; instead, it employs these distinctions as a meta-level foundation for formalizing the dynamics of value in socio-economic systems.